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bstract
African bond markets have been steadily growing in recent years, but nonetheless remain undeveloped. African countries would benefit from
reater access to financing and deeper financial markets. This paper compiles a unique set of data on government securities and corporate bond
arkets in Africa. It then applies an econometric model to analyze the key determinants of African government securities market and corporate
ond market capitalization. Government securities market capitalization is directly related to better institutions and interest rate volatility, and
nversely related to smaller fiscal deficits, higher interest rate spreads, exchange rate volatility, and current and capital account openness. Corporate
ond market capitalization is directly linked to economic size, the level of development of the economy and financial markets, better institutions,
nd interest rate volatility, and inversely related to higher interest rate spreads and current account openness. Policy implications follow.
 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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.  Introduction
The African Development Bank recently announced that it
lans to launch a new bond program for infrastructure to raise
p to US$40 billion for investments in projects such as ports
nd airports, highlighting the growing role for bond markets in
nancing development in sub-Saharan Africa.1 Yet bond mar-
ets in these countries are at a nascent stage of development and
here is a strong need to promote their development.
First, sub-Saharan Africa has been heavily dependent on
xternal grants and concessional loans for funding capital spend-
ng and government deficits. Only a small number of countries
ave limited access to global capital markets.2 Additionally,
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 202 623 6782.
E-mail address: ymu@imf.org (Y. Mu).
1 IHS Global Insight, August 20, 2012.
2 Gross official developmental assistance to sub-Saharan Africa amounted to
S$49 billion in 2010, accounting for 32 percent of total government consump-
ion expenditure, with 83 percent grants and 17 percent concessional loans,
ccording to World Bank and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
evelopment data.
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
879-9337 © 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier
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c Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.estern donors are now facing substantial fiscal challenges
nd consequently donor flows to sub-Saharan Africa may be
caled back significantly. Without access to alternative sources
f finance, including bond markets, many African countries
ould find it difficult to finance critical needs. Second, well-
unctioning bond markets help sustain economic stability. The
sian experience supports this point; since the 1997 Asian
nancial crisis, many Asian economies have made signifi-
ant progress in strengthening bond market development. This
as in turn helped these Asian economies weather the recent
lobal financial crisis because deeper financial markets gener-
ted valuable funding sources for these countries to finance fiscal
timulus packages. Third, the development of bond markets in
ub-Saharan Africa can improve the intermediation of savings.
lthough Africa needs money, it is a net capital exporter to the
est of the world (IMF, 2012). This is mainly because there is
 lack of effective intermediate channels to absorb this capital.
ond markets are an effective way to intermediate capital savers
ith capital users. Fourth, promoting bond market development
n sub-Saharan Africa can improve the structure of the African
nancial system, which is currently dominated by banks. The
on-banking sector and bond markets, both public and private,
re still in their infancy. Bond markets and bank finance are
omplementary rather than incompatible. While banks tend to
e more adept at providing short-term (working) capital, bond
arkets enjoy a comparative advantage in financing government
eficits and infrastructure investment, and providing longer-term
apital to companies for growth. Fifth, deeper bond markets will
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nable central banks in sub-Saharan Africa to conduct monetary
olicy more effectively. At present, many banks have few domes-
ic fixed-income instruments to use for sterilization other than
hort-term government debt. Deeper bond markets would pro-
ide a wider, more effective range of instruments for monetary
olicy implementation.
This paper investigates empirically the determinants of local
urrency bond markets in sub-Saharan Africa.3 Although a
umber of countries have issued sovereign bonds in foreign cur-
encies, we focus on local currency bond markets because of
he importance of the local currency markets compared to inter-
ational sovereign bonds and because of the need to focus on
frican countries’ ability to overcome what is referred to in the
iterature as “original sin,” that is, the inability to issue debt in
ocal currency.4
We use data for local currency government securities mar-
et capitalization for 36 countries, over the years 1980–2010,
long with a newly developed database for corporate bond mar-
et capitalization. This sample makes the study the largest of
ts kind in terms of both number of countries included and
umber of years covered. To investigate the determinants of
ond markets, we draw upon an econometric approach used
n Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Claessens et al.
2007), and Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009), among oth-
rs. We use generalized method of moments estimation, in view
f possible endogeneity among variables relevant to bond market
evelopment.
This research aims to achieve three purposes. First, it outlines
he current situation of local currency bond markets including
oth government securities and corporate bond markets in sub-
aharan African countries. Second, it discusses and estimates
ey determinants of bond market development in sub-Saharan
frica. Finally, it offers policy advice for enhancing bond market
evelopment in sub-Saharan Africa.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the
elevant literature. Section 3 provides an overview of the gov-
rnment securities and corporate bond markets in sub-Saharan
frica. Section 4 sets out the analytical framework and dis-
usses the econometric methodology underpinning the empirical
nalysis. Section 5 presents and discusses the results from the
stimation. Section 6 draws out the policy implications of the
ndings from the previous section and concludes.
.  Literature  review
The research on African financial sector development is
rowing. Most of the literature has so far focused on finan-
ial development of the banking sector and stock markets
e.g., Detragiache et al., 2005; McDonald and Schumacher,
007; Yartey and Adjasi, 2007; Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009;
3 Russ and Valderrama (2012) provide an overview of the theoretical literature
egarding the choice between bank and bond finance.
4 In 2010, we estimate international sovereign bonds, issued by sub-Saharan
ountries, at US$5 billion (according to Bloomberg International) compared to
ocal currency government securities markets of US$135 billion.
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nayiotos and Toroyan, 2009; Kablan, 2010; and Beck et al.,
011). Relatively little attention has focused on development of
ublic and private bond markets.5
Several studies have examined the determinants of bond
arkets in more developed economies. Eichengreen and
uengnaruemitchai (2004) consider a broad set of determi-
ants of bond market development, using panel data from 1990
o 2001, for a sample of 41 developing and developed coun-
ries, with a focus on emerging Asia. After regressing several
easures of domestic currency bond markets capitalization on
arious explanatory variables, they conclude that market size
atters, while poor accounting standards hinder development
f private debt markets, along with corruption and low bureau-
ratic quality. Well-capitalized bank systems promote bond
arkets. Stability of exchange rates encourages bond market
evelopment, and an absence of need for public financing dis-
ourages public bond markets. Capital controls also discourage
ond market development. Eichengreen et al. (2008) extend
his analysis on a range of developing and developed coun-
ries, with a focus on Latin America. In line with Eichengreen
nd Luengnaruemitchai (2004), they find that country size is
ositive and significant, with a concave relationship. GDP per
apita is also positive and concave and trade openness is posi-
ive and significant. The domestic interest rate is negative and
ignificant only for government bonds. Interest rate volatility is
ositively correlated with the private bond market and negatively
ith the government bond market. Domestic credit is positively
nd concavely related to financial bonds. The interest rate spread
s positively correlated with the corporate but not public bond
arket. The opposite is found for financial bonds. Stricter capi-
al controls are correlated with large public bond markets, but do
ot influence private bond markets. Larger public debt is linked
o large public bond markets but is not significant with regard to
rivate bond market determinants.
Eichengreen et al. (2008) find however counterintuitive
esults regarding some of the institutional and corporate gov-
rnance variables. For instance, they find that stronger creditor
ights result in smaller private bond markets. Countries with
egal codes of French origin have larger bond markets and those
ith German and Scandinavian legal codes have the largest bond
arkets. Latitude is negative and significant along with the Latin
merican dummy variable. They conclude that a limited num-
er of policy variables and country characteristics explain the
ifference in private bond capitalization between Latin America
nd advanced economies. Country size and level of develop-
ent are critical along with development of the financial system
nd historical and geographical factors. Policy variables such as
acroeconomic stability, openness, investor protection, cost of
ontract enforcement, and pension privatization also have some
xplanatory power.Claessens et al. (2007) focus on public bond market develop-
ent. Their data covers developing and developed countries,
ver the 1993–2000 period and they incorporate a range of
5 Felman et al. (2011) and Gray et al. (2011) investigate market infrastructure
spects of development of bond markets in Asia and other emerging economies.
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xplanatory variables covering macroeconomic and institutional
actors. In contrast to the other studies, they specify the depen-
ent variable in logarithms and address potential endogeneity
f some of the explanatory variables through use of lagged or
nitial values. They find that economies that are larger and have
reater domestic investor bases, measured by the size of the
nancial system, have larger domestic bond markets. Less flex-
ble exchange regimes are associated with less domestic debt
elative to foreign borrowing. Other relevant variables include
nflation, fiscal burden, legal origin, and capital account open-
ess. More recently, Bae (2012) examines the determinants of
ond market development in China, using data from 43 devel-
ping and developed countries over the 1990–2009 period. This
tudy distinguishes public, private, and financial bond markets.
he main findings are that the degree of economic development,
easured by GDP per capita, is the most important variable.
n government bond markets, the fiscal balance is robust, with
igher deficits leading to larger bond markets. In financial bond
arkets, no variable is robust, except GDP per capita. In cor-
orate bond markets, low interest rates, a large banking sector,
nd well-developed government bond markets are conducive to
arket development. Institutional quality does not seem impor-
ant.
The only study to bring focus to corporate debt in
ub-Saharan Africa is Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009),
hich applies the panel data framework of Eichengreen and
uengnaruemitchai (2004) to analyze using generalized least
quares the determinants of domestic debt market capitalization
or 23 African countries, over the period 1990–2008.6 For the
ublic debt stock, they find that the investment profile, exchange
ate variability, no capital controls, and the fiscal balance are all
ositive and significant while the quality of the bureaucracy and
he interest rate spread are negative and significant. For the pri-
ate debt stock, domestic bank credit, exchange rate variability,
o capital controls, and the fiscal balance are positive and sig-
ificant while GDP per capita and interest rate variability are
egative and significant. However, their sample size is limited,
specially for the corporate bond market estimation, possibly
ompromising the robustness of the results. Furthermore, the
ssumption that explanatory variables are exogenous to bond
arket development may not be valid, making problematic the
ask of identifying determinants.7 As such, the existing research
6 One of the key constraints on this research is the lack of any centralized
atabase. Christensen (2005) collects data from national sources on domestic
ebt securities, covering effectively 20 African countries between 1980 and
000; Abbas and Christensen (2007) extend this, using monetary survey data
rom 1975 to 2004; Panizza (2008) collects data from multiple sources on domes-
ic and external debt over the period 1990–2007 for 130 countries, including
8 African countries. However, all these databases exclude corporate bonds –
ven though there are over 20 countries actively involved in issuing corporate
ebt over the past decade, with an increasing number of countries participating
ecently.
7 For example, the fiscal balance drives debt stocks but the interest on an
xisting debt stock may drive the fiscal balance, especially if the debt stock is
ignificant. Thus fiscal balance might be endogenous in the model. Similarly,
nterest rate volatility and spread may be endogenous in a model explaining the
ebt stock.
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s helpful, but further examination of potential endogeneity of
ome key explanatory variables would be warranted.
Our empirical specification draws upon Eichengreen and
uengnaruemitchai (2004), Eichengreen et al. (2008), Adelegan
nd Radzewicz-Bak (2009), and Bae (2012). This study makes
everal contributions relative to this literature. First, it carefully
istinguishes in its measurement of government securities mar-
et capitalization, marketable from non-marketable central bank
ebt. Debt associated with extension of lending to government
y the central bank may constitute a significant proportion of
omestic government debt in African countries, yet may not
rovide an indication of the development of the domestic cur-
ency bond market. Second, this research provides a much more
omplete coverage of sub-Saharan African domestic govern-
ent securities and corporate debt. The empirical investigation
nvolves a large sample of observations, with 36 countries cov-
red over the period 1980–2010.8 Also, we develop a database
or corporate debt for sub-Saharan Africa, including 24 coun-
ries that had active corporate bond markets over the period
980–2010. Moreover, the intention is that this database may
rovide the groundwork for a fuller database in the future, which
ay be expanded regularly over time and as more countries
ecome active within the corporate debt market. Third, this
tudy contributes by employing a wide array of variables drawn
rom the existing literature. Fourth, it confronts possible endo-
eneity more comprehensively by using generalized method of
oments estimation (GMM), thus shedding further light on the
eterminants of bond market development.
.  Current  situation  of  government  securities  and
orporate bond  market  in  sub-Saharan  Africa
This section presents stylized facts of local currency gov-
rnment securities and corporate bond markets in sub-Saharan
frica. It first provides an overview of the current status of these
arkets and their development relative to other developing and
merging market and advanced economies. Second, this sec-
ion analyzes the recent evolution of these markets. Finally, it
xamines local currency bond market development in light of
eterogeneity across the African continent.
Local currency bond markets in sub-Saharan African coun-
ries are still at a nascent stage of development with market
apitalization of both government securities and corporate bonds
ypically much lower than those of other developing, emerging,
nd advanced economies as a percentage of GDP (Fig. 1). The
overnment securities market capitalization as a percent of GDP
as 14.8 percent in 2010 in sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast,
sian and Central European countries surpass this measure, and
enerally speaking most Latin American countries do as well,
xcluding Argentina and Chile.
8 The sample includes: Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
entral African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo,
epublic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
uinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
amibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
waziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.
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Fig. 1. Bond market comparisons, 2010 (percent of GDP) (Economic and
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) countries in the sample
include: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, and
Gabon. West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries in
the sample include: Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal, and Togo. Oil
exporters, fragile countries, low and middle income countries are taken from
the International Monetary Fund classification of sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. Oil exporters include: Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo,
Gabon, and Nigeria. Fragile countries include: Burundi, Central African Repub-
lic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Guinea, and
Guinea-Bissau. Low income countries include: Ethiopia, The Gambia, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda.
Middle income countries include: Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho,
Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia).
Sources: IMF staff compilation based on data from IMF, IFS, WEO and World
B
a
o
t
a
o
p
t
c
p
S
t
c
r
a
p
p
o
i
d
t
A
t
W
h
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t 
B
o
n
d
 M
a
rk
e
t 
C
a
p
it
a
liz
a
ti
o
n
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Sub- Sahara n Afr ica All South Afr ica
All (e xcluding S. Africa) CEMAC
sretropxE liOUMEAW
Fragile Countries Low Income
Middle Income
Fig. 2. Government bond market capitalization, 2006–2010 (percent of GDP).
Sources: IMF staff compilation based on data from IMF, IFS, WEO and World
Bank, ADI, BIS and national sources for corporate bond market capitalization.
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
 B
o
n
d
 M
a
rk
e
t 
C
a
p
it
a
liz
a
ti
o
n
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Sub- Sahara n Afr ica All South Afr ica
All (e xcluding S. Africa) CEMAC
sretropxE liOUMEAW
Fragile Countries Low Income
Middle Income
Fig. 3. Corporate bond market capitalization, 2006–2010 (percent of GDP).
S
B
a
A
a
b
T
p
c
t
1
(
d
c
Africa has grown as a share of GDP from 1 percent in 2006
to 1.8 percent in 2010 (Fig. 3). When taken together, the share
of corporate bonds in total bonds has increased rather rapidlyank, ADI, BIS and national sources for corporate bond market capitalization.
This disparity is even greater for corporate bonds. On aver-
ge, average capitalization of corporate bonds was 1.8 percent
f GDP in 2010 for sub-Saharan African countries, whereas
his figure was generally much larger for other developing
nd emerging economies, with the exception of Poland. More-
ver, the low level of development of the bond market is
articularly apparent upon comparison with the capitaliza-
ion of more advanced economies, and, in the case of the
orporate bond market, the capitalization ranges from 26.5
ercent of GDP for Canada to 98.6 percent for the United
tates.
Also evident is a notable disparity for sub-Saharan Africa in
erms of the relative importance of government securities and
orporate bonds in local currency. In this region, the local cur-
ency bond market is dominated by government securities, with
 share of 89.2 percent of the total market capitalization, com-
ared to the share of corporate bonds which stands at just 10.8
ercent, in 2010. This contrasts with the situation in other areas
f the world. Aside from Poland, the share of corporate bonds
n total bonds in sub-Saharan Africa is smaller than in other
eveloping and emerging economies.
We can also look at these data by subgroups. We divide
he sample into eight groups: South Africa; all sub-Saharan
frican countries in the sample excluding South Africa; Cen-ral African (or CEMAC) member states; West African (or
AEMU) member states; oil exporters; fragile countries that
ave recently emerged from conflict; low-income countries; mources: IMF staff compilation based on data from IMF, IFS, WEO and World
ank, ADI, BIS and national sources for corporate bond market capitalization.
nd middle-income countries.9 With the exception of South
frica, these subgroups display both relatively low percent-
ge capitalizations and a relatively less developed corporate
ond market compared to the government securities market.
he middle income countries have the most developed cor-
orate bond market capitalization, followed by the WAEMU
ountries.
In recent years, the government securities market capitaliza-
ion has tended to fall, with market capitalization falling from
8.7 percent of GDP in 2006 to as low as 14.1 percent in 2009
Fig. 2). Only in 2010, in the face of widening fiscal deficits,
id average capitalization expand somewhat to 14.8 percent. In
ontrast, corporate bond market capitalization for sub-Saharan9 See Diouf and Boutin-Dufresne (2012) for development of WAEMU bond
arkets.
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μˆi =  θ  +
∑L
l=1γlZi,lt +  ηi,t (2)
10 The definition and measurement of these variables are provided in more
detail below.
11 We also experimented by including time trends in view of possible non-
stationarity in the variables in the model, although results are relatively robust
and are not repeated herein for brevity.
12 This approach is useful if the assumption of independence between random
effects and explanatory variables is not met, in which case a fixed effects model
may be preferred. Moreover, this second step in the estimation sheds light onank, ADI, BIS and national sources for corporate bond market capitalization.
rom just 5.1 percent in 2006 to 10.8 percent in 2010. Further-
ore, the relative importance of corporate bonds as a source
f finance is broad-based and these trends are robust across
ifferent subgroups.
The growth in the corporate bond market has recently been
trong for many sub-Saharan African countries. Both aggre-
ate size and the number of countries with active markets has
ncreased, with average capitalization (excluding South Africa)
limbing from approximately zero in 1989 to over 1.3 percent
f GDP in 2010 and by 2009 there were as many as 23 active
orporate bond markets (Fig. 4). However, South Africa has
ad a different experience. From 1989 to 2000, the capitaliza-
ion declined from around 25 percent to less than 15 percent,
hich may be explained by economic and political uncertainty
urrounding the end of the apartheid era in 1994. Since 2000,
owever, South Africa’s corporate bond markets have been on
he road to recovery, and as of 2010, market capitalization
limbed to almost 20 percent of GDP.
In summary, over recent years the corporate bond market
as become an increasingly important component of the total
ond market in the region. Although corporate bonds remain at
 nascent stage of development, the market has been expand-
ng in a consistent fashion. Moreover, the growth of corporate
onds relative to government securities suggests that the cor-
orate bonds could in the future be a very important source of
nance for many sub-Saharan African countries.
.  Analytical  framework
This section sets out the analytical framework, which
xtends the baseline econometric model of Eichengreen and
uengnaruemitchai (2004) to two-phase estimation under fixed
ffects to account for both time-variant and time-invariant
ariables. Furthermore, a generalized method of moments
ramework is introduced to account for possible endogeneity
mong the variables relevant to bond market development.
t
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.1.  Baseline  econometric  model
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) investigate the
mportance of a set of fundamental factors that they hypothe-
ize are linked to bond market development. They classify the
xplanatory variables into a number of natural groups, including
tructural (economic size and trade openness), financial (size of
he banking sector and the bank interest rate spread), develop-
ental (income per capita and institutions), and macroeconomic
the overall fiscal balance, interest rate and exchange rate vari-
bility and whether capital controls are in place). In view of this,
he model we employ is of the form:
i,t = α + δ(μi + μt) +
∑K
k=1
βkXi,kt +
∑L
l=1
γlZi,lt + εi,t (1)
here Yi,t is the dependent variable, bond market capitaliza-
ion (public or corporate bond market capitalization); Xi,t are
ime-variant explanatory variables (GDP, trade openness, private
ector credit, GDP per capita, institutional variables, fiscal bal-
nce, interest rate spread, interest and exchange rate variability,
nd capital account openness); Zi,t are time-invariant explana-
ory variables (area and legal origin); and μi and μt are country-
nd time-fixed effects respectively.10 Country specific effects
ontrol for systematic differences across countries, including
hat the data come from different sources and differences in
riteria for classifying corporate bonds, whereas time specific
ffects control for common shocks across countries, such as
lobal shocks.11
Several panel data models are employed along the lines of
he above specification: pooled ordinary least squares (POLS),
andom effects (RE), and fixed effects (FE) models, with δ  = 0
n Eq. (1) in the pooled model, whereas if δ = 1, the model col-
apses to a two-way specific effects model. Whereas a number
f researchers employ the fixed effects model to account for
ifferences across countries, this involves the assumption that
he fixed effects are uncorrelated with regressors. However, if
his assumption is violated, as is often the case, the estimator is
iased in the same way as least squares estimates. Therefore, the
pecification above is flexible in its treatment of specific effects.
urthermore, because the standard fixed effects estimator does
ot identify the effect of time-invariant variables on bond market
apitalization, an additional phase of estimation is introduced in
he form of a regression of the estimated country-specific effects,
ˆ i, on Zi,t variables following Cheng and Wall (2005)12:he importance of time-invariant variables for bond market capitalization while
urging fixed effects from effects of time-invariant variables.
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To account for endogeneity, we use generalized method of
oments estimators. The principle of this method is to choose
nstruments which satisfy a set of orthogonality conditions.
e employ the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano
nd Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and popu-
arly employed in the context of financial sector development
nd more broadly within the field of development economics
e.g. Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009; Collier and Goderis, 2009;
hauvet et al., 2010; Kablan, 2010). Applying the baseline panel
ata specification of our model, including time dummies, we
btain a system of two equations: one differenced and one in
evels. Variables in levels in the second equation are instru-
ented with their own first differences, which usually increase
fficiency. Endogeneity within the system is determined on a
riori grounds on the basis of those variables which are most
ikely to be endogenous, although we explore different scenar-
os in this regard. Thus the estimations, carried out using pooled,
andom and fixed effects methods, and generalized method of
oments estimators, provide robust evidence on the model.
.2.  Dependent  variables
Two variants of the dependent variable are constructed:
 measure of government bond market capitalization (gdebt)
nd corporate bond market capitalization (cdebt). The first
ependent variable is measured as the value of government
omestically issued and marketable securities as a percentage
f GDP. The second is the value of corporate bonds outstand-
ng as a percentage of GDP. We note that government debt is
entral government debt while corporate debt includes bonds
ssues by corporate entities, which may have a relatively large
hare of state-sponsored or public enterprises, which are corpo-
ate in nature. In much of the region, there are few firms large
nough to issue corporate debt on their own and thus much of the
arketable corporate debt derives from public or quasi-public
nterprises. Moreover, because the focus of this study is on bond
arket development as a market-based phenomenon, the exclu-
ion of non-marketable debt implies the use of net rather than a
ross measure of public debt to form the measure of government
ecurities market capitalization.
Data for total outstanding domestic local currency govern-
ent securities are obtained for the majority of countries from
he International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook
WEO) database, with data for the remaining countries obtained
ither from the International Monetary Fund’s International
inancial Statistics (IFS) database or the World Bank’s African
evelopment Indicators (ADI) database. Data for central bank
ending to the government is obtained from the International
onetary Fund’s Monetary and Financial Statistics (MFS)
atabase. Collection of the data for domestically issued cor-
orate bonds required considerable effort, since no centralized
atabase exists for sub-Saharan African countries. Data are col-
ected for local currency corporate bonds, from multiple sources
isted in Tables 1a and 1b, the vast majority of which are
rimary sources, including: stock exchanges, securities commis-
ions, capital market authorities and central banks. The sources
ften do not provide a full breakdown of the type of corporate
F
o
at Finance 3 (2013) 121–135
onds issued. Rather the total market capitalization is reported.
hese data may thus include parastatal, quasi-government, and
upranational corporate bonds as well as those issued by finan-
ial institutions and multinational corporations. Furthermore,
n a few cases data are obtained through secondary sources,
ncluding the African Development Bank and Adelegan and
adzewicz-Bak (2009) study. Similar, if not identical figures are
ublished by primary and secondary sources where data exist for
oth.
.3.  Independent  variables
The independent variables include measures of economic
ize (econsize), trade openness (tradeopen), banking sector size
credit), bank lending spread (spread), interest rate variabil-
ty (intvol), exchange rate variability (xrvol), capital account
penness (capopen), the fiscal balance (fiscal), economic
evelopment (gdpcap), law and order (laworder), corrup-
ion (corruption), investment profile (invprofile), bureaucracy
bureaucracy), composite risk (comprisk), countries whose legal
rigin is English (legalorigin), and country size in terms of
and area (area). These factors are defined below and are dis-
ussed in light of their theoretical relationship with bond market
evelopment below.
.3.1.  Economic  size
Countries with smaller economic size are less likely to have
ell-developed bond markets because they would tend to lack
he scale efficiencies required for deep and liquid markets. The
ypical amount of capital raised from issuance may be too small
o attract multinational companies and foreign investors, for
nstance, and to justify inclusion by leading investment banks
n global bond markets indices, in which case there will be no
emand by investors to hold local securities in order to track
he index (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004). In addi-
ion, infrequent buying and selling would tend to lead to greater
rice volatility and discourage risk-average investors. GDP at
urchasing power parity is employed as a suitable proxy for
conomic size and a country’s area in squared kilometers as
 proxy for geographic size. Data are obtained from the ADI
atabase.
.3.2. Trade  openness
It is argued that more open economies encourage securities
arket development because established interests may not be
ble to insist on policies that suppress competing sources of sup-
ly when the economy is exposed to international competition
Rajan and Zingales, 2003). However, it may also be the case
hat countries which are less integrated with external economies
ave more incentive to develop domestic bond market markets
n order to meet their financing needs (Adelegan and Radzewicz-
ak, 2009). Our priors on this variable are thus ambiguous.
ollowing Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), trade
penness is measured as the total exports of goods and services as
 percentage of GDP. Data are obtained from the ADI database.
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Table 1a
Determinants of government securities markets.
Least squares Random effects Fixed effects
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Econsize 0.010 0.011 0.022 −0.052* −0.018 −0.009 −0.065* −0.053* −0.052*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.032) (0.025) (0.024)
Tradeopen −0.079* −0.063 −0.052 −0.038 −0.148* −0.123 −0.121 −0.270** −0.309**
(0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.059) (0.071) (0.067) (0.068) (0.094) (0.093)
Gdpcap 1.526*** −0.691*** −0.669*** 1.318** −0.201 −0.358 0.763 −0.172 0.129
(0.383) (0.195) (0.187) (0.431) (0.457) (0.448) (0.574) (0.717) (0.759)
Credit 0.083* 0.158*** 0.155*** 0.153* 0.005 0.077 0.231* −0.117 −0.235*
(0.038) (0.041) (0.046) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073) (0.093) (0.115) (0.119)
Intvol 21.380*** 10.470** 9.985** 1.045 −0.082 −5.797 −9.219 −7.364 −7.505
(3.482) (3.163) (3.035) (4.354) (4.125) (4.201) (5.093) (4.721) (4.750)
Spread −0.284*** −0.175*** −0.175** −0.259*** −0.166** −0.274*** −0.371*** −0.268*** −0.309***
(0.071) (0.052) (0.053) (0.066) (0.052) (0.055) (0.075) (0.060) (0.057)
Xrvol −4.183 −8.605 −9.247 −21.610*** −26.600*** −17.530** −13.320* −24.730*** −23.170***
(7.470) (4.754) (4.841) (5.687) (5.106) (5.530) (6.435) (5.930) (5.926)
Fiscal −0.380** −0.442*** −0.429*** −0.388*** −0.626*** −0.688*** −0.484*** −0.853*** −0.809***
(0.129) (0.121) (0.122) (0.099) (0.100) (0.111) (0.113) (0.113) (0.115)
Capopen 2.154*** 0.824 1.092* −1.671* −1.862* −1.558* −2.429** −3.281*** −2.900**
(0.552) (0.506) (0.481) (0.720) (0.769) (0.783) (0.794) (0.914) (0.986)
Area −0.010*** −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.004 −0.006 −0.008 −0.005** −0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Legalorigin 1.946 2.716* 1.317 7.423 8.145* 4.960 6.546*** 9.935*** 8.343***
(1.306) (1.300) (1.266) (4.698) (4.012) (3.397) (1.372) (1.555) (1.900)
Comprisk 0.087 0.341*** 0.258*
(0.096) (0.082) (0.104)
Invprofile 0.521 0.092 −0.076
(0.420) (0.383) (0.400)
Laworder 1.659* 2.791*** 4.098***
(0.664) (0.775) (0.848)
Corruption −0.524 0.138 0.099
(0.689) (0.726) (0.825)
Bureaucracy −1.559 −1.523 −1.006
(0.917) (1.015) (1.105)
Cons 11.520** 9.860 12.500* 14.560*** 3.777 12.950 17.060** 15.320 21.620**
(4.397) (7.470) (5.841) (4.101) (6.626) (9.384) (6.093) (8.237) (6.512)
N 506 328 328 506 328 328 506 328 328
RE, FE NO NO NO RE*** RE*** RE*** FE*** FE*** FE***
RE vs FE FE*** FE*** FE***
* Significance at 10%.
** Significance at 5%.
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tandard errors reported in parentheses.
.3.3.  Banking  sector  size
Greater development of bank lending may discourage bond
nance because in some ways the two are competitors. On the
ther hand, banks may seek bond markets to place surplus funds.
nd banks serve as dealers and market makers. They may thus
oster development of a liquid and well-functioning bond market
Harwood, 2000 and Hawkins, 2002). As such, bank and bond
nance could either be complements or substitutes. Following
evine and Zervos (1998), banking sector size is proxied by the
rivate sector domestic credit as a percentage of GDP. Data are
DI database..3.4.  Bank  lending  spread
We would expect the lending spread to be important to bond
arket development because interest rates, being the cost of
4
d
rebt, would be integrally linked to the willingness to borrow
hrough debt issuance. Higher interest rates would discourage
ond issuance. However, the bank lending spread, in contrast to
he interest rate itself, could reflect the degree of competition
nd efficiency in the bank sector and thus, a higher spread could
ncourage the bond market, if it is associated with greater inef-
ciency (Eichengreen et al., 2008). The bank lending spread is
easured by the bank signature lending rate minus the London
nterbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), with data sourced from the
DI database and the British Bankers’ Association..3.5. Interest  rate  variability
Interest rate variability could be important if investors have
ifferent degrees of risk aversion. Interest rate variability may
educe the attractiveness of holding bonds for a risk-averse
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Table 1b
Determinants of government securities markets using GMM.
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3
Econsize 0.015 0.005 0.022** 0.011 0.007 0.021***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005)
Tradeopen −0.079*** −0.072** −0.055 −0.079** −0.107*** −0.096***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.039) (0.036) (0.016) (0.018)
Gdpcap 1.930*** −0.249 −0.093 2.098*** −0.710*** −0.637***
(0.352) (0.204) (0.229) (0.252) (0.092) (0.094)
Credit 0.113*** 0.198*** 0.168*** 0.055 0.133*** 0.108***
(0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.041) (0.016) (0.017)
Intvol 97.330*** 41.410*** 34.390*** 29.930*** 2.469 2.246
(9.713) (7.970) (7.829) (5.649) (1.895) (1.978)
Spread −0.864*** −0.328*** −0.290*** −0.275*** −0.023 −0.025
(0.146) (0.095) (0.098) (0.091) (0.027) (0.028)
Xrvol −39.810*** −29.470*** −27.010*** −15.480** −9.275*** −8.900***
(7.361) (6.901) (7.425) (6.868) (2.452) (2.532)
Fiscal −0.141 −0.626*** −0.545** −0.148 −0.416*** −0.295***
(0.191) (0.218) (0.247) (0.170) (0.059) (0.064)
Capopen −1.258 −3.517** −2.386 −0.693 −2.529*** −2.407***
(1.828) (1.515) (1.663) (1.231) (0.352) (0.378)
Area −0.018*** −0.020*** −0.019*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.013***
(0.001) −0.002 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Legalorigin −2.737 0.985 0.372 5.756*** 4.977*** 4.403***
(2.747) (1.432) (1.529) (1.677) (0.507) (0.572)
Comprisk 0.373*** 0.179***
(0.117) (0.037)
Invprofile 0.688 0.143
(0.502) (0.189)
Laworder 2.117*** 1.553***
(0.664) (0.282)
Corruption 0.735 0.429
(0.671) (0.289)
Bureaucracy −0.058 0.899**
(1.065) (0.413)
Cons −3.011 −9.582 2.063 0.163 8.966*** 12.300***
(4.492) (8.821) (5.511) (4.138) (2.747) (2.044)
N 506 328 328 506 328 328
Hansen Test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
AR(1) Test 0.088 0.171 0.105 0.709 0.968 0.920
AR(2) Test 0.606 0.306 0.287 0.299 0.280 0.248
GMM versus FE GMM*** GMM*** FE GMM*** GMM*** GMM***
* Significance at 10%.
*
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tandard errors reported in parentheses.
nvestor and a high degree of variability, with fixed-rate assets,
ould tend to preclude development of longer-term issues.
nterest rate variability may also reflect a thin market. For
his study, the standard deviation of interbank interest rates is
mployed as a proxy for interest rate variability. Since this vari-
bility may change over the sample, this measure is calculated as
he logarithm of the standard deviation over 10-year periods. In
ddition, where the interbank rate is not available, as is the case
or a number of countries, the treasury bill rate is used instead.
ata are obtained from the IFS database.
.3.6.  Exchange  rate  variability
Similarly, exchange rate variability could be relevant to par-
icipants in financial markets, with several countervailing effects
n bond market development. On the one hand, pegged or rela-
ively fixed exchange rates may encourage foreign investors to
k
o
qemand for bonds, which would encourage bond market devel-
pment but could on the other hand lead some to underestimate
he risk of lending to banks and corporations and the result-
ng foreign competition may slow the development of domestic
ntermediation (Goldstein, 1998). To measure the exchange rate
ariability, the standard deviation of the change in the logarithm
f the nominal exchange rate is calculated. As with interest rate
ariability, the calculation of the standard deviation is over 10-
ear periods to account for changes in volatility over the sample
eriod. Data are from the IFS database.
.3.7. Capital  account  openness
Capital account openness may also be relevant to bond mar-
et development. On the one hand, some have suggested that
penness to foreign portfolio investment enhances governance
uality of local corporations and access of domestic debt to
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oreigner investors (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009). On
he other hand, capital controls may provide an incentive for
overnments and firms to source finance from local rather than
xternal capital markets. The Chinn–Ito Index, developed by
hinn and Ito (2006), is employed to proxy for capital account
penness. This measure is based on the binary dummy variables
hat codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial
ransactions reported in the IMF’s Annual  Report  on  Exchange
rrangements and  Exchange  Restrictions  (AREAER), includ-
ng indications of the presence of multiple exchange rate
egimes, current account transactions, capital account transac-
ions, and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds
a higher number indicating a more closed account). While con-
aining variation over time and referring to the intensity of capital
ontrols, the index has a relevant coverage of countries and time
eriod for this study. The index is updated to 2010.
.3.8. Fiscal  balance
Fiscal policy can affect bond market development in several
ays. On one hand, according to Harwood (2000), a well-
eveloped government securities market may indirectly promote
he development of a corporate bond market in that it “helps pro-
ote a class of dynamic, profitable fixed-income dealers” (p.
3). On the other hand, a large supply of government debt secu-
ities may crowd out private debt securities, slowing corporate
ond market development. Therefore, according to these argu-
ents the relationship is theoretically ambiguous. The measure
f fiscal balance in this study is calculated as a three-year moving
verage of past budget balances. As has been noted in the litera-
ure, the moving average of past budget balances is preferable to
any alternative measures, especially a single year, because the
udget balance in a single year may be dominated by transient
actors (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004). Data are
btained from the ADI database.
.3.9. Economic  development
There are a number of reasons why economic develop-
ent may foster bond market development. For example, less
eveloped countries have volatile investment environments and
overnments are typically heavily involved in commercial activ-
ty. Second, less developed countries often have weak creditor
ights, inadequate transparency, and poor corporate governance.
or instance, La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the rule of law
aries as a function of GDP per capita. Therefore, GDP per
apita can be thought of as capturing these aspects of underde-
elopment in the event that they are not fully captured by other
xplanatory variables. Data are obtained from the ADI database.
.3.10. Law  and  order
La Porta et al. (1998) predict that common law systems in
he British tradition, which are thought to offer stronger investor
rotection than systems in the French civil law tradition, should
romote the development of financial markets. Furthermore,
ountries with English legal systems are more likely to have
arket-based financial systems while countries with legal sys-
ems based on civil law are more likely to have bank-based
nancial systems (Levine and Demirguc-Kunt, 1999). To proxy
f
m
o
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or strength of the legal system, two measures are employed.
irst, a dummy variable is constructed, indicating whether a
ountry’s legal origin is English, based on data published in the
IA World Factbook. Second, the International Country Risk
uide’s (ICRG’s) index of law and order is employed, which is
ased on the aggregation of two separate assessments for law and
rder, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points.
he law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and
mpartiality of the legal system, while the order sub-component
s an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a coun-
ry can enjoy a score of 6, which equates to a very high level
f law and order, or a rating of 0, which indicates instead a
ery low level. The advantage of the ICRG measure over the
ummy variable approach is that it is provided annually and on
 country-by-country basis, hence it also contains information
n the evolution of law and order, while distinguishing between
ountries which have the same legal traditions.
.3.11.  Corruption
Corruption is a threat to investment since it distorts the eco-
omic and financial environment and introduces instability into
he political process. Corruption within the financial sector also
akes it more difficult to conduct business effectively, and could
orce the withdrawal or withholding of investment, whereas cor-
uption may also undermine law enforcement. This indicates a
egative association between corruption and bond market devel-
pment. The ICRG index of corruption is employed for this
tudy, which provides an indication of corruption within the
olitical and financial system. A corruption index score of 6
oints equates to very low corruption and a score of 0 indicates
ery high corruption.
.3.12. Investment  proﬁle
Bonds are a way for investors to limit risk, since entities issu-
ng bonds are generally of higher credit quality than those issuing
quity claims (Harwood, 2000). It may not always be the case,
owever, that there are sufficient high quality issuers with sound
usiness models and records of financial prudence. The ICRG
easure of investment profile is employed, which provides an
ssessment of factors affecting the risk to investment. The risk
ating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents (contract via-
ility/expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays),
ach with a maximum score of 4 points and a minimum score of
 points. For the aggregate index, a score of 12 points equates to
ery low risk for investors and a score of 0 points to very high
isk.
.3.13. Bureaucracy
If bureaucracy, governance, and regulation are weak,
nvestors will be reluctant to take positions in markets character-
zed by opportunistic participants and delivery risk. Moreover,
lements of an adequate regulatory framework include disclo-
ure standards, penalties for accountants and auditors providing
alse information, and sanctions for insider trading and market
anipulation, whereas a clear and consistent implementation
f regulations may also be important. To proxy for bureaucracy
nd governance, the ICRG measure of bureaucracy is employed,
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development of domestic bond markets. Legal origin is positive
and significant suggesting that English origin encourages gov-
ernment securities markets, the expected result. The composite
13 The penultimate row ‘RE, FE’ in the table indicates whether country and
time effects are included in the estimation. Since there are no specific effects
in the pooled least squares model, a ‘NO’ is indicated, whereas a ‘RE’ or ‘FE’
is indicated for the two-way random or fixed effects models respectively due
to inclusion of specific effects, along with outcomes of Breusch–Pagan and F
tests for random and fixed effects respectively (a rejection of the null indicates30 Y. Mu et al. / Review of Devel
hich provides an assessment of the institutional strength and
uality of the bureaucracy over time and across countries. A
core of 4 points equates to very high institutional strength and
uality of the bureaucracy and a score of 0 is very unfavorable.
.3.14. Country  size
Countries that are larger may achieve significant economies
f scale in domestic markets and thus would tend to have more
eveloped markets for a range of goods and services, including
nancial services. We would thus expect larger countries to have
ore developed corporate bond markets. The result for govern-
ent bonds might be more ambiguous because small countries
ould need to rely more heavily on public funding. Data are
btained from the ADI database.
.3.15. Comprisk
This variable is a composite of law and order, corrup-
ion, investment profile, and bureaucracy variables, and is also
btained from ICRG. It is the sum of the index value and because
ll the variables are defined with the better outcome as a higher
umber, the higher the value of this variable, the better the quality
f institutions or the lower the risk.
.4.  Endogeneity
In principle, a number of variables considered in this study
ould both depend on and influence each other. We hypothesize
hat the endogenous variables are: the dependent variables, bond
arket capitalization (gdebti,t or cdebti,t), and then several of the
xplanatory variables, interest rate variability (intvoli,t), bank
nterest rate spread (spreadi,t), and fiscal balance (fiscali,t). Our
stimation is a reduced form, which takes into account both
emand and supply side factors. Focusing first on the two interest
ate variables, both demand and supply for bonds depend on
revailing market interest rates. However, the government also
as the capacity to influence market rates. Hence the supply of
onds could drive interest rates and thus there is reverse causality
rom bonds to interest rates. Focusing on the fiscal balance, in
frica, many governments are constrained in their ability to
orrow. Hence the size of the fiscal deficit may be driven by
he availability of debt finance. Hence for all three variables,
e employ a generalized method of moments estimator to take
ccount of potential endogenous relationships.
.  Empirical  ﬁndings
Tables 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b present the results of the esti-
ation for government securities and corporate bond market
apitalization under pooled, random effects, fixed effects, and
MM estimations. For each model, three separate estimations
re undertaken, one without the risk variables and two with the
isk variables, one in which the four variables are entered sepa-
ately and one in which the composite variable is used. There is
 significant loss of sample when we use the risk variables, and
hus we present all three results. The outcomes are reported in the
a” tables in columns 1–9 under least squares, random effects,
p
T
1
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nd fixed effects, and in the “b” tables for the GMM estima-
ions. The two variants of the GMM estimation make different
ndogeneity assumptions. The A1 and A2 estimations assume
nly the fiscal balance is endogenous and the B1 and B2 assume
hat the fiscal balance, interest rate variability, and interest rate
pread are endogenous.
.1.  Government  securities  markets
Table 1a presents our initial exploration making use of pooled
r least squares, random effects, and fixed effects regression,
ith three variants of each in terms of explanatory variables.
e find two variables, spread and fiscal balance, have a consis-
ent negative sign and are significant. These results suggest that
 larger interest rate spread discourages government securities
arket capitalization and as the fiscal balance improves, there is
ess need for a government securities market. The latter result is
ntuitive, while the former suggests that market interest rates may
ove in step, and when bank rates increase, treasury rates rise as
ell, hence the larger spread discourages government securities
ssuance. Furthermore, observation of the estimated coefficients
nder the random effects and fixed effects models indicates that
he results are similar, for the significant variables. The Haus-
an test, provided in these tables, indicates a general preference
or the fixed effects over the random effects specification.13
Focusing on the fixed effects results, we find that in addi-
ion to the spread and fiscal balance variables, economic size
as a negative effect on the government securities market, con-
istent with the idea that larger economies facilitate greater
ptions for government funding and thus there is less reliance
n government securities markets. Trade openness is negative
nd significant, but only when the risk variables are included.
apital account openness is negative and significant as well.
hese results suggest that more open economies facilitate greater
nancing options and thus discourage domestic financing mar-
ets. Bank credit share in the economy produces inconsistent
stimates. In the specification in which the risk variables are
ncluded, the coefficient is negative, but only significant when
he risk variables are specified separately, possibly because in
ertain circumstances easier availability of bank credit may
educe the extent of the government’s reliance on borrowing
rom securities markets. Exchange rate volatility is negative and
ignificant, plausibly suggesting that volatility with regard to
he external value of domestic interest payments discouragesresence of specific effects). For the former test, see Breusch and Pagan (1980).
he final row ‘RE vs FE’ presents outcomes of a Hausman test (see Hausman,
978). If the fixed effects model is preferred, then ‘FE’ is indicated, along with
he statistical significance of the test statistic, otherwise ‘RE’ is reported.
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isk variable is positive and significant, suggesting that countries
ith relatively low risk environments or stronger institutions
ave more developed government securities markets. Among
he four variables in the composite index, law and order appears
o have the strongest effect. Area is negative and significant, but
nly when the risk variables are excluded. Altogether, the results
re generally plausible and suggest that government policies to
nsure a sound macroeconomy and better institutions promote
overnment securities markets.
Turning to the GMM estimations in Table 1b, we find a
igh degree of similarity of the results under two different
pecifications14,15 Focusing thus on the specification “B” with
he assumption about endogeneity of fiscal balance, interest rate
olatility, and interest rate spread, we find a high degree of sim-
larity with the fixed effects estimations, especially with regard
o the negative spread, and negative and significant fiscal bal-
nce, exchange rate volatility, and trade and capital openness
ariables and the positive and significant legal origin, compos-
te risk, and law and order variables. Interestingly, we obtain a
ositive effect of economic size, in contrast to the earlier neg-
tive result, which is probably more sensible since economic
ize enables economies of scale to be achieved in government
ecurities markets. In addition, GDP per capita is negative and
ignificant after controlling for risk, whereas previously it was
ot significant. Interest rate volatility is positive, which may
eflect that securities markets are preferred to some other forms
f financing, such as bank loans, when there is high interest
ate volatility. Finally, land area is negative and significant, sug-
esting larger countries have less need of government securities
arkets.
Our results present a contrast with those in Eichengreen
nd Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Adelegan and Radzewicz-
ak (2009), the two most comparable studies. Eichengreen and
uengnaruemitchai find a positive effect of GDP at purchasing
ower parity, exports, and an open capital account, while we find
he former mixed depending on methods and the latter two vari-
bles negative. However, the results are similar in that the interest
ate spread, exchange rate volatility, and fiscal balance are nega-
ive. Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009) find fairly dissimilar
esults, especially that an improved fiscal balance encourages
he government securities market.
.2.  Corporate  bond  market
Table 2a presents our initial exploration for the corporate
ond market, making use of three estimation procedures with
hree variants of explanatory variables, as in the government
arkets estimation. The sample is notably smaller, because we
se only those countries with active bond markets, 24 as opposed
o the 36 countries used for the government securities markets,
nd with complete data. We find that economic size and GDP
14 GMM (A1, A2, A3) considers fiscal endogeneity; GMM (B1, B2, B3) con-
iders fiscal, intvol, and spread endogeneity.
15 We also explore using different lag lengths and subsets of the instruments
nd find results are quite robust to changes.
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er capita are generally positive and significant, the latter consis-
ently so, suggesting that larger and more developed economies
re more likely to have corporate bond markets, consistent with
ur expectations. Interestingly, there are no other variables that
re consistent in sign and significance across the variations. In
ddition, the specification tests indicate whether the random or
xed effects model is the preferred specification and in this case,
he Hausman test suggests the random effects model is more
ppropriate.
Focusing, thus, on the random effects outcome, we find that
n addition to economic size and GDP per capita, land area is
ositive and significant, in the specification with the compos-
te risk variable, while the comprisk variable is negative and
ignificant. The former result is intuitively plausible, while the
atter result is surprising but may given the earlier result that
ower risk encouraged government securities markets, suggest
ome degree of substitutability of these markets with corporate
ond markets. When disaggregating the risk variable, we find
hat bureaucratic quality has a positive and significant effect on
orporate bond markets, which is plausible. The macroeconomic
olicy and openness variables are not significant, and credit share
n the economy is negative and significant, only in the regression
ithout risk variables. In short, in contrast to the government
ecurities market, we find that there are fewer variables that are
ignificantly linked to corporate bond market capitalization, but
e do find the plausible result that economic size has a posi-
ive relationship and the somewhat unintuitive result that lower
isk or better quality of institutions exerts a drag on corporate
ond market development, which may reflect some substitutabil-
ty between government securities and corporate bond markets.
he results thus suggest that government influences corporate
ond market development indirectly through speeding up eco-
omic growth but that specific policies are less clearly linked to
orporate bond market development.
Turning to the GMM estimations in Table 2b, we find that con-
rolling for endogeneity of some key policy variables enlarges
he number of factors that are significantly related to corporate
ond market development. Focusing thus on the specification
B” with the assumption about endogeneity of fiscal balance,
nterest rate volatility, and interest rate spread, we find that sim-
lar to the random effects estimations, economic size and GDP
er capita are positive and significant, and generally, land area
s as well. In contrast to the earlier random effects findings, we
nd that trade openness is negative, consistent with the findings
or government securities markets, and capital account open-
ess has a positive effect, in the regressions that control for
isk (and a negative effect otherwise). Interestingly, credit share
n the economy now has a strongly significant effect on cor-
orate bond market development, suggesting that these bond
arkets thrive where credit’s role in the economy is already well
stablished. Interest rate spread exerts a negative effect in the
egressions that control for risk, whereas interest rate volatility
as a mixed effect across “B” specifications. Furthermore, as fis-
al balance improves, corporate bond market development lags,
hough the variable is not always significant. In contrast to the
arlier findings for the government securities market, legal origin
n non-English origin countries leads to greater development of
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Table 2a
Determinants of corporate bond markets.
Least squares Random effects Fixed effects
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Econsize 0.008* −0.001 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014** 0.011*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Tradeopen −0.053*** −0.087*** −0.029 −0.020 −0.025 −0.020 −0.022 −0.043 0.003
(0.011) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) (0.016) (0.033) (0.033)
Gdpcap 0.196** 0.578*** 0.250*** 0.934*** 0.623*** 0.870*** 1.059*** 1.228*** 1.317***
(0.067) (0.123) (0.065) (0.137) (0.121) (0.124) (0.144) (0.192) (0.193)
Credit 0.076*** 0.102*** 0.097*** −0.128*** −0.017 −0.015 −0.148*** −0.152*** −0.021
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022)
Intvol −2.014 −1.231 3.085** 1.573 1.522 0.091 1.095 2.072 −0.563
(1.283) (1.641) (1.138) (1.092) (1.384) (1.300) (1.141) (1.936) (1.522)
Spread −0.007 0.012 −0.063 0.001 −0.053 −0.025 0.003 0.005 −0.027
(0.039) (0.043) (0.037) (0.025) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.031) (0.032)
Xrvol 0.956 −10.290* −2.449 −4.253 −3.941 −2.410 −5.448* −6.417* −4.013
(3.983) (5.044) (2.691) (2.299) (2.252) (2.133) (2.379) (2.985) (2.556)
Fiscal −0.063* 0.082 0.014 0.034 0.041 0.046 0.045 0.049 0.039
(0.029) (0.045) (0.033) (0.03) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.043) (0.039)
Capopen −0.449 0.167 0.662*** −0.268 0.445 −0.543 −0.248 −0.948* −1.332*
(0.238) (0.194) (0.192) (0.237) (0.327) (0.411) (0.253) (0.439) (0.597)
Area 0.002** 0.005*** 0.001 0.004 0.006** 0.005 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Legalorigin −0.760 −0.157 −3.329*** 2.049 0.371 0.943 −5.289** 5.047* 2.044
(0.679) (0.826) (0.714) (3.595) (1.613) (1.965) (1.653) (2.139) (1.439)
Comprisk −0.164** −0.069* −0.018
(0.057) (0.034) (0.045)
Invprofile −0.075 −0.098 −0.125
(0.129) (0.093) (0.110)
Laworder 0.548** 0.265 0.456
(0.204) (0.252) (0.340)
Corruption 0.247 −0.054 −0.074
(0.204) (0.186) (0.224)
Bureaucracy −0.283 1.748** 2.807***
(0.515) (0.538) (0.743)
Cons 0.586 9.765* 12.500*** −1.305 2.461 −6.723* 4.152*** 5.757 −5.516*
(0.742) (3.814) (2.723) (2.966) (3.155) (3.113) (0.923) (3.146) (2.507)
N 170 128 128 170 128 128 170 128 128
RE, FE NO NO NO RE*** RE*** RE*** RE*** RE*** RE***
RE vs FE RE*** RE*** RE***
* Significance at 10%.
**
*
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endogeneity.
When compared to previous results in Eichengreen and
Luengnaruemitchai (2004), they find comparable results for
16 The Hausman test, the outcomes of which are reported in Tables 1b and 2b,
investigates differences in GMM coefficients reported in these tables with
the preferred fixed and random effects coefficients reported previously in
Tables 1a and 2a (see Hausman, 1978).
17 Diagnostic evaluation involves the Hansen test for validity of instruments
(see Hansen, 1982); the Arellano–Bond AR test for estimation consistency (seeSignificance at 5%.
** Significance at 1%.
tandard errors reported in parentheses.
he bond market and law and order and lower corruption are pos-
tively related, more intuitive results than the negative relation of
he risk variables in the random effects estimation. Altogether,
he results display greater variation between the random effects
nd GMM estimates than for the government securities mar-
et. Nonetheless, there are a number of plausible results, mainly
entered on larger size and greater development of the econ-
my leading to more developed corporate bond markets. Credit
arket development is complementary to bond market develop-
ent. Reduced risk or improved institutions appears to exert a
ositive effect here as in the government securities markets. The
olicy variables show a more mixed pattern.
Although previous results obtained using specific effects
odels generally concur with those obtained using GMM esti-
ation, evidently there are some differences in view of the
iscussion above. Moreover, as is formalized by Hausman test
A
t
A
tutcomes reported in Tables 1b and 2b, these differences are suf-
cient to suggest that GMM estimation is helpful in addressing
16,17rellano and Bond, 1991). Test statistics reported in Tables 1b and 2b suggest
hat GMM findings are useful since the null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond
R tests for estimation consistency and Hansen test for instrument validity are
ypically not rejected.
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Table 2b
Determinants of corporate bond markets using GMM.
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3
Econsize 0.006* 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tradeopen −0.091*** −0.041* −0.045* −0.058*** −0.039*** −0.027***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Gdpcap 0.341 0.426*** 0.328*** 0.116*** 0.312*** 0.263***
(0.230) (0.145) (0.088) (0.040) (0.048) (0.030)
Credit 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.087*** 0.091***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Intvol −7.285 −0.492 −0.947 −6.518*** 0.732 3.000***
(7.799) (4.929) (3.325) (0.751) (1.418) (0.851)
Spread 0.334** −0.019 0.009 −0.001 −0.043 −0.032*
(0.164) (0.111) (0.082) (0.025) (0.027) (0.019)
Xrvol 5.877 2.279 −0.124 4.190** −3.749* −1.781
(10.310) (9.601) (4.133) (1.802) (2.017) (1.485)
Fiscal −0.001 −0.228** −0.173* −0.124*** −0.044 −0.008
(0.124) (0.099) (0.090) (0.021) (0.027) (0.023)
Capopen −1.642** 0.788 0.655 −0.071 0.486*** 0.376***
(0.671) (0.570) (0.542) (0.151) (0.162) (0.130)
Area −0.001 0.004* 0.003 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Legalorigin 2.206 −3.035* −2.617** −0.759 −2.360*** −3.015***
(1.592) (1.549) (1.294) (0.469) (0.591) (0.425)
Comprisk −0.082* −0.034*
(0.045) (0.020)
Invprofile −0.183 −0.065
(0.168) (0.059)
Laworder 0.151 0.438***
(0.285) (0.106)
Corruption 0.040 0.356***
(0.399) (0.120)
Bureaucracy −0.092 −0.014
(0.758) (0.219)
Cons −1.887 2.751 −0.699 1.774*** 3.079* −1.259
(3.790) (3.299) (2.252) (0.655) (1.616) (0.878)
N 170 128 128 170 128 128
Hansen Test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
AR(1) Test 0.634 0.308 0.282 0.001 0.346 0.399
AR(2) Test 0.217 0.748 0.355 0.044 0.216 0.065
GMM versus RE RE GMM*** GMM*** GMM*** GMM*** GMM***
* Significance at 10%.
*
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This paper contributes to our understanding of sub-Saharan
African government securities and corporate bond markets.
While African countries have relied on government securities** Significance at 5%.
** Significance at 1%.
tandard errors reported in parentheses.
he importance of economic size and credit share, and inter-
stingly, the same negative effect of English origin. Adelegan
nd Radzewicz-Bak (2009) also find that credit share is posi-
ive but find that economic size, measured by GDP per capita,
s negative, a contrasting result.
.3.  Sensitivity  and  robustness
To investigate the robustness of the results, we assess sensi-
ivity of results to changes in the sample, using GMM estimates
ith four endogenous variables and the composite risk vari-
ble, for both the government securities and corporate bond
arket results. The analysis, reported in Mu et al. (2013),
eapplies GMM estimation in view of various changes to the
ample, including: a truncated period, 1993–2010, all countries
xcluding South Africa, all countries excluding fragile states, all
d
hountries excluding WAEMU states, and all countries excluding
EMAC states.18 The outcome from this analysis, which is not
resented here for brevity, suggests a fairly high degree of simi-
arity across the different estimations, bolstering the robustness
f the results presented in Tables 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b.19
.  Concluding  ﬁndings  and  policy  implications18 These country groups have regional stock exchanges.
19 Full details and findings from the sensitivity analysis con-
ucted originally by Mu et al. (2013) can be found at
ttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1312.pdf.
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or financing fiscal deficits, domestic securities markets remain
nderdeveloped and most countries are overly dependent on for-
ign borrowing and bank borrowing, a few still from their central
anks. Corporate bond markets remain at a nascent stage of
evelopment in most sub-Saharan African countries and, with
he exception of South Africa, are small. In recent years, how-
ver, corporate bond markets have begun growing steadily and
ook set to become ever more important as a source of finance in
he future, as African countries attempt to close the infrastructure
nd development gap with more advanced economies.
Our results suggest that it is useful to look separately at gov-
rnment securities and corporate bond markets in sub-Saharan
frican countries. Turning first to government securities mar-
ets, we find that, using a GMM specification, a combination
f structure, policy, and institutions variables appear to exert
 statistically significant effect on government securities mar-
ets. The interest rate spread, the fiscal balance, exchange rate
olatility, trade and capital openness variables, and land area are
egatively correlated with the development of the market, while
nglish legal origin, lower composite risk (or better institutions),
aw and order, and domestic interest rate volatility variables are A
m
Country Securities exchange
Botswana Botswana Stock Exchange 
Cameroon Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange, BVMACb
Cape Verde Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde 
CARc BVMAC 
Chad BVMAC 
Congo, Rep. BVMAC 
Cote d‘Ivoire BRVMd
Ethiopia None 
Gabon BVMAC 
Ghana Ghana Stock Exchange 
Guinea-Bissau BRVM 
Kenya Nairobi Stock Exchange 
Mali BRVM 
Mauritius Stock Exchange of Mauritius 
Namibia Namibia Stock Exchange 
Nigeria Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Rwanda Rwanda Stock Exchange 
Senegal BRVM 
South Africa Bond Exchange of South Africa 
Swaziland Swaziland Stock Exchange 
Tanzania Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange 
Togo BRVM 
Uganda Uganda Securities Exchange 
Zambia Lusaka Stock Exchange 
a MCM (2009) corresponds to data used in the study of Adelegan and Radzewicz-
b BVMAC is the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières d’Afrique Centrale.
c CAR is the Central African Republic.
d BRVM is the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières.t Finance 3 (2013) 121–135
ositively correlated. Turning next to corporate bond markets,
e find that, using a GMM specification, a somewhat narrower
et of significant variables. We find that economic size, GDP per
apita, and land area are positive and significant, suggesting, in
ontrast to the government securities market findings, that large
ize, however measured, appears to be the key factor. Credit
hare in the economy has a strongly significant effect on corpo-
ate bond market development, suggesting that corporate bond
arkets thrive in economies where credit is well entrenched.
enerally speaking, these results are intuitive.
From the above exercise, we can draw the following policy
mplications. Sub-Saharan African governments should strive
o develop their economies and this will in turn lead to greater
orporate bond market development and deeper government
ecurities markets, which will have a virtuous influence on eco-
omic development. Both corporate and government securities
arkets benefit from improved macroeconomic policies and
nstitutions.
Bond Markets in Africa
ppendix  A.  Sub-Saharan  Africa  corporate  bond
arket database,  1980–2010
Activity Source
1997–2010 MCM (2009), Botswana Stock Exchangea
2005–2010 African Development Bank
2007–2010 Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde
2007–2010 African Development Bank
2007–2010 African Development Bank
2007–2010 African Development Bank
1999–2010 BRVM Regional Securities Exchange
2006–2010 National Bank of Ethiopia
2007–2010 African Development Bank
1996–2010 Ghana Securities Exchange Commission
1999–2010 BRVM Regional Securities Exchange
1996–2010 Kenya Capital Markets Authority
1999–2010 BRVM Regional Securities Exchange
1990–2006 Mauritius Stock Exchange
2001–2010 Bank of Namibia, Namibian Stock Exchange
1981–2010 MCM (2009), Securities Exchange Commission
2008–2010 Rwanda Stock Exchange
1999–2010 BRVM Regional Securities Exchange
1989–2010 Bank for International Settlements
1990–2010 Central Bank of Swaziland
2002–2010 MCM (2009), Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange
1999–2010 BRVM Regional Securities Exchange
1998–2010 Uganda Capital Markets Authority
2000–2010 Lusaka Stock Exchange
Bak (2009).
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